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John  Cornwall  built  his  analysis  of  Modern  Capitalism  on  a  combination  of  two 
strands of thought; the Schumpeter-Svennilson view of capitalist development as a 
process of qualitative change driven by innovation and diffusion of technology, and 
the Kaldorian idea of static and dynamic economies of scale in manufacturing as the 
driving force behind economic progress in the industrialized world. Combining these 
(and other) insights into a coherent perspective on modern economic growth was an 
important achievement in itself. He also provided convincing evidence from a group 
of industrialized countries in the fifties and sixties that supported his interpretation of 
the events. What we have done in this paper is to update and extend his empirical 
analysis using a larger sample of countries and more recent data. We have found that 
the  Schumpeter-Svennilson  perspective of  growth  as  a  process  of  qualitative (and 
structural) change, and the emphasis on the importance of skills and flexibility, has a 
lot to commend it. On the second set of ideas the evidence is more ambiguous. At 
least  for  many  of  the  technologically  and  economically  most  advanced  countries, 
manufacturing does not seem to be the ‘engine of growth’ assumed by Kaldor and 
Cornwall.   
 
 
   1 
1. Introduction 
 
The last decade has witnessed important changes in how economic growth is conceived 
by the economic profession. The traditional neoclassical model (Solow 1956), based on 
the ideas of perfect competition, decreasing returns and exogenous technology (a global 
public good), has had to give way to more realistic approaches emphasizing among other 
things  innovation  (through  R&D  investments  or  learning  in  private  firms),  scale 
economics and market power.
1 This change of perspective was clearly anticipated by 
John Cornwall in his path-breaking study Modern Capitalism (1977). Here he suggests a 
model  of  economic  growth  in  which  technological  progress  is  endogenized,  i.e.,  an 
“endogenous growth model” to use a more recent term. Manufacturing, Cornwall argues, 
plays an important role in this context, because it is the locus of technological progress, 
whether in the form of learning by doing (scale economics) or as the result of search 
activities  by  entrepreneurs.  Hence  his  main  focus  is  on  what  shapes  growth  in 
manufacturing (since this is considered to be the main source of overall growth). 
  A  central  issue  in  the  recent  discussions  on  economic  growth  is  the  so-called 
“convergence-controversy”. Do poor countries catch up with the rich ones and if so, 
why? Under the standard assumptions,
2 the traditional neoclassical model predicts that 
due to decreasing returns to capital accumulation, convergence in GDP per capita will 
more or less automatically occur.
3 This was - as might be expected - not Cornwall’s 
position. He argued that although the existence of technology-gaps between rich and 
poor countries does imply a potential for technological catch-up through imitation, the 
realization of this potential requires a lot of extra effort (and in particular, investment). 
Hence, according to Cornwall’s view, convergence is conditional on investment and 
other necessary supporting factors. He was probably the first to present empirical tests 
for  what  since  has  been  dubbed  “conditional  convergence”,  and  to  discuss  the 
implications of this notion for long run differences in growth between countries. 
                                                             
1 For overviews see Verspagen (1992) and Fagerberg (1994). 
2 These include among other things a common technology,  equally available to all countries ( a global 
public good),  identical saving-rates  (or more generally that the incentives to save are the same) and  a 
identical rates  of labor force growth, see Fagerberg (1994) for an extended discussion.  
3 If saving behavior and labor force growth differ across countries, countries will still converge towards 
the same rate of growth of GDP per capita (given by exogenous technological progress), but  the levels 
of GDP per capita in long-run equilibrium will differ.  Hence, only countries that share the same 
characteristics (in terns of savings behavior and labor force growth) will converge towards the same 
level of GDP per capita. This is often called “conditional convergence”  (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 
1995)   2 
  As Cornwall himself was the first to recognize, his theoretical perspective was richer 
than his modeling efforts or subsequent empirical work. For instance, he pointed out that 
the prospects for growth were not the same across all manufacturing industries and that, 
indeed, some of them might be more important than others in fostering technological 
progress and, hence, growth. However, in his model and empirical tests he focused on 
manufacturing as a whole. His empirical work, mainly based on data for the fifties and 
sixties, gave some support to the idea of manufacturing as an “engine of growth”, as well 
as to his emphasis on investment-embodied catch-up as an important source of growth in 
manufacturing. In this paper we return to these and related questions for a larger group 
of  countries  and  a  more  recent  time  period.  We  ask:  is  there  any  evidence  that 
manufacturing is an “engine of growth” in this later period, and are all manufacturing 
industries equally conducive to growth? What does this more recent evidence have to 
say about the impact on growth of investment in physical capital compared to the impact 
of other supporting factors such as, for instance, education and R&D? Finally we raise 
the issue of what all this tells us about the working of contemporary “modern capitalism” 
as compared to that of the fifties and sixties. 
 
2. Manufacturing - an 'engine of growth' ? 
 
One  of  the  most  crucial  hypotheses  in  “Modern  Capitalism”  is  that  of  the 
manufacturing sector as the engine of economy wide growth. Cornwall points to two 
main arguments for this.  
  First, the manufacturing sector displays dynamic economies of scale through so-
called  “learning  by  doing”  (Young,  1928,  Kaldor,  1966,  1967):  When  production 
expands, the scope for learning and productivity increases becomes larger. Hence, the 
rate of growth of productivity in manufacturing will depend positively on the rate of 
growth of output in manufacturing (the Kaldor-Verdoorn law
4).  
  The second line of argument concerns the special role of the manufacturing sector 
in enhancing productivity growth through its linkages with the non-manufacturing 
sectors.  Cornwall  argues  that  the  manufacturing  sector  is  characterized  by  strong 
backward linkages, i.e., increased final demand for manufacturing output will induce 
                                                             
4 There is an extensive literature on this topic, both theoretical and empirical, which it is beyond the 
scope of this paper to summarize (see, e.g., McCombie and Thirlwall, 1994).   3 
increased demand in many sectors ‘further down the line’.
5 In other words, increased 
output  in  manufacturing,  due  to  increased  final  demand,  does  not  only  lead  to 
increased productivity in the manufacturing sector (the Kaldor-Verdoorn law), but 
also to increased output and, perhaps, productivity in the sectors further down the line. 
In addition to these backward linkages, Cornwall emphasizes that the manufacturing 
sector also has many forward linkages, through its role as a supplier of capital goods 
(and the new technologies that these goods embody). In fact, he considers capital 
goods  from  the  manufacturing  sector  to  be  the  main  carriers  of  new  technology 
(Cornwall  1977,  p.  135).  Moreover,  although  “learning  by  doing”  may  be  an 
important source of productivity growth in non-manufacturing industries as well, it is 
argued that the realization of this 'learning potential' will in many cases require capital 
goods supplied by the manufacturing sector. 
  Cornwall's model of economic growth can be summarized in two equations as 
follows (ibid., p. 139): 
  (1) 
  (2) 
  In these equations, Q is output, qr is GDP per capita relative to the technology 
leader  (the  U.S.),  I/Q  is  investment  as  a  fraction  of  output,  c,  a,  b,  d  and  e  are 
parameters and the subscript m indicates the manufacturing sector. Equation (1) states 
that manufacturing is the engine of growth, hence the parameter a1 is expected to be 
positive, and larger than the share of manufacturing in GDP. Equation (2) introduces a 
feedback  from  overall  demand  growth  on  manufacturing  production,  hence  a2  is 
expected to be positive. In addition it allows for catching up by industrial latecomers 
(hence  d  is  expected  to  be  negative).  The  inclusion  of  the  investment  share  (e 
positive) reflects Cornwall’s emphasis on investment as a necessary supporting factor 
for successful catch-up. 
                                                             
5 An empirical approach to the study of such linkages is the so-called triangulation of input-output 
matrices (Cornwall 1977, pp. 130-135). This procedure takes an input-output table and rearranges the 
order of the sectors (rows and columns) of the table such that (in the ‘ideal’ case) a sector only supplies 
to sectors listed above it, and only purchase from sectors listed below it. Hence, sectors ranked at the 
top tend to purchase large quantities from other sectors (further below) and supply mostly to final 
demand, while sectors ranked at the bottom tend to supply mostly to other sectors (instead of final 
demand), only being dependent on a limited number of other sectors for their inputs. Cornwall  argues 
that work based on this methodology show that manufacturing is a sector with strong backward 
linkages: it supplies a relatively large part of its output to final demand, and purchases large quantities 
of inputs from other sectors.   4 
  Cornwall does not estimate equation (1), but refers to OLS estimates by Kaldor 
(1966), Cripps and Tarling (1973) and the UN (1970). Based on data for developed 
market economies in the fifties and sixties, these studies estimate a1 to be about 0.6, 
more than twice the share of manufacturing in GDP. Hence, the evidence from these 
studies seems to support the hypothesis of manufacturing as an engine of growth. 
However,  in  Cornwall’s  model,  both  GDP  growth  and  growth  of  manufacturing 
output  are  endogenous  variables,  and  in  that  case  equation  (1)  should  have  been 
estimated by a method other than OLS. Indeed, the OLS estimate of 0.6 may be 
seriously biased. 
  Looking  at  the  model  in  equations  (1)  and  (2)  from  a  simultaneous  equation 
perspective, one must conclude that the second equation is not identified. It does not 
satisfy the order condition, which says that the equation must exclude at least N-1 
exogenous variables, where N is the number of equations in the model (in this case 2). 
Hence,  it  cannot  be  estimated  by  any  estimation  technique.
6  The  first  equation, 
however, is over-identified, and may be estimated by a single equation technique that 
takes  the  simultaneous  equation  bias  into  account,  such  as  for,  instance,  the 
instrumental variables/two-stage least squares method (2SLS).  
  The analysis here will proceed by using such a procedure to estimate equation (1) 
for  a  large  sample  of  countries.  The  sample  includes  67  countries:  19  developed 
countries (including Japan), 6 countries from East Asia and the Pacific (excluding 
Japan), 18 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, 17 sub-Saharan African 
countries, and 7 other countries (among which 2 oil exporters). We thus have a rather 
heterogeneous set of countries. The dependent variable is the growth rate of GDP in 
real terms over 1973 - 1989 (taken from the Penn World Tables
7, version 5.5). The 
independent variable is the growth rate of manufacturing value added (in fixed prices) 
for  the  same  period,  taken  from  World  Development  Indicators  (World  Bank).
8 
However, for some of the developed countries, no data on manufacturing growth were 
available in World Development Indicators. For these countries data were taken from 
                                                             
6  Cornwall solved the identification problem by estimating only the reduced form of the model, which 
is adequate for testing the overall explanatory power of the model. However, when one wants to test 
the role of manufacturing as an engine of growth separately from the other elements of the theory, this 
approach is not sufficient, because in general one can not calculate a parameter estimate for a1 from the 
reduced form.. 
7 We use the RGDP variable, i.e., real GDP in international prices using a Laspayeres price index. 
8 Version on CD-ROM, 1997.   5 
the STAN database (OECD). Both growth rates are average annual compound growth 
rates over the period specified. 
  To estimate the equation with the chosen (instrumental variable) technique, we 
need a number of exogenous variables (or instruments). The chosen variables are in 
most cases well known from previous econometric work in this area: Initial GDP per 
capita  (in  log-form,  taken  from  the  Penn  World  Tables),  investments  in  physical 
capital as a share of GDP (mean value over 1973 - 1989, also from the Penn World 
Tables),
9 education (enrollment of the relevant age group in secondary education, 
from the World Development Indicators) and inflation (yearly average increase in the 
CPI  1973-1989,  taken  from  the  World  Development  Indicators).  Finally,  and  less 
conventionally,  we  include  a  variable  for  technology  investment
10  as  proxied  by 
patents (taken out in the US over the 1975 - 1985 period per head of the population of 
the country in question, as recorded by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office).
11 
  A well-known problem in estimations using cross-country data sets is the possible 
bias from inclusion of outliers, i.e., countries with patterns that deviate from the other 
countries in the sample. If such countries are included, we may be lead to conclusions 
that in fact are not valid for the majority of the countries in our sample. We therefore 
adopt a procedure which identifies and excludes such outliers.
12 
 
                                                             
9  Due to data availability we use economy wide investment as a share of GDP instead of investment in 
manufacturing as a share of manufacturing output. 
10  See Fagerberg (1987,1988) for discussion of different indicators of technology gaps and technology 
investment, and an analysis of the impact of technology gaps and technology investment on growth. 
11 As with most of the literature in this area we use patents taken out in the U.S., because this provides 
us with the more consistent and economically relevant data than data drawn from a variety of different 
national sources.  
12 This method identifies outliers by calculating the so-called hat-matrix, X(X
TX)
-1X
T, where X is the 
matrix of independent variables. Observations with entries larger than 2*k/n, where k is the number of 
independent variables, and n the number of observations in the regression, were excluded. See Belsley 
et al. (1980).   6 
Table  1.  Estimation  results  for  Cornwall’s  ‘manufacturing  as  an  engine  of 














1  OLS  Market 
economies (17) 
0.104 (0.70)  0.024 (11.55***)  0.00 
2  2SLS  Market 
economies (14) 
0.083 (0.21)  0.024 (6.01***)  0.00 
3  OLS  East Asia, Latin 
America (22) 
0.721 (12.36***)  0.008 (3.20***)  0.88 
4  2SLS  East Asia, Latin 
America (17) 
0.829 (8.45***)  0.006 (1.82*)  0.83 
5  OLS  Other countries 
(22) 
0.371 (4.47***)  0.014 (3.00***)  0.47 
6  2SLS  Other countries 
(15) 
0.827 (2.86***)  -0.005 (0.35)  0.40 
7  OLS  all countries, no 
dummies (61) 
0.514 (10.54***)  0.014 (7.49***)  0.65 
8  2SLS  all countries, no 
dummies (49) 
0.488 (5.98***)  0.016 (5.62***)  0.49 
9  OLS  all countries, 
dummies (61) 
0.473 (8.45***)  continent 
dummies 
0.69 
10  2SLS  all countries, 
dummies (45) 
0.719 (4.54***)  continent 
dummies 
0.57 
Values between brackets are absolute t-statistics. One, two and three stars denote significance 
at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively, in a 2-tailed t-test. 
 
  The results of the instrumental variable/2SLS estimations are given in Table 1. The 
results for OLS are also provided for reference.
13 Estimates are reported for the three 
country groupings and for the sample as a whole. The three country groupings are the 
developed market economies, comparable to Cornwall’s sample (though larger), the 
                                                             
13 Note that the 2SLS estimates generally have fewer observations, due to missing values for some of 
the instrumental variables.   7 
industrializing  countries  of  East  Asia  and  Latin-America  and  a  group  of  other 
countries (low income), most of which are from Sub-Saharan Africa.  
  In general, the results obtained by the instrumental variable/2SLS method are not 
very different from those obtained by OLS.
14  Hence, simultaneity bias does not seem 
to be an important problem here. This might indicate that the feedback from overall 
growth on manufacturing output is not so important after all, i.e., that manufacturing 
growth  is important for overall growth, but not the other way around.  
  For  the  sample  as  a  whole  there  appears  to  be  a  significant  positive 
relationship  between  manufacturing  growth  and  GDP  growth,  with  coefficient 
estimates close to the 0.6. estimate cited by Cornwall, and significantly larger than the 
share  of  manufacturing  in  GDP  at  the  5%  level.  This  might  be  interpreted  as 
supporting the idea of manufacturing as an engine of growth. But from inspecting the 
estimates  for  the  three  subsamples  it  becomes  clear  that  this  result  is  very  much 
dependent on the inclusion of countries other than the developed market economies. 
For the  East Asia - Latin America group  as well as the 'other countries', we find a 
highly significant and positive relationship between the two variables. However, for 
the developed countries the evidence is less clear.  Initially, a significant and positive 
relationship was found for the developed market economies, but this result turned out 
to depend heavily on the inclusion of three outliers (Italy, Japan and Finland). When 
these countries were excluded, we found no evidence of a relationship between the 
growth  of  GDP  and  manufacturing  growth.
15    Thus,  although  manufacturing  may 
explain some of the difference in growth between the three outlier countries and the 
remaining  developed  countries  in  the  sample,  it  clearly  does  not  explain  the 
differences in growth performance among the latter. 
 
 
                                                             
14  The 2SLS estimates are higher than the ones obtained by OLS in three cases, and in two cases is it 
the other way around. However, in no case are the 2SLS estimates significantly different from those 
obtained by OLS at a 5 % level of significance. 
15 It is possible that the engine of growth equations as estimated here suffer from a bias due to omitted 
variables. Manufacturing may indeed be an important factor explaining growth in other sectors, but 
there may be other factors explaining economy wide growth, or growth in non-manufacturing sectors, 
which should have been taken into account when estimating the relationship. For instance, one might 
argue (e.g., Cornwall, 1977, p. 133) that some of the factors explaining growth in manufacturing also 
explain economy wide growth, i.e., one may include some of the instrumental variables in our 2SLS 
procedure as exogenous variables in equation (1). We tested various equations from this perspective, 
but always found that the results reported above are robust to the inclusion of other possible 
explanatory factors. These results are available from the authors on request.   8 
  In summary, the results in this section indicate that for most developed market 
economies, manufacturing no longer plays the important role it was found to play in 
the 1950s and 1960s. This is in sharp contradiction to Cornwall's theory in ‘Modern 
Capitalism’,  which  posits  that  such  a  relationship  should  exist,  particularly  for 
developed  countries.
16  However,  Cornwall’s  argument  on  the  relevance  of 
manufacturing  seems  to  hold  good  for  a  number  of  fast-growing  ‘newly 
industrializing countries’ (NICs) as well as for some developing countries. 
 
3. Growth and transformation 
 
 
In “Modern Capitalism” Cornwall depicts growth as a process of qualitative change 
(transformation), with large and persistent differences in factor-returns between dynamic 
and less dynamic activities. Hence, he points out, the economic success - or lack of such 
- of a country will to a large extent depend on its "flexibility", i.e., its ability to devote 
(transfer) resources to new and promising activities. As discussed in the previous section 
he attaches a lot of importance to the performance in manufacturing which he saw as the 
center of technological progress in the economy. Within manufacturing, he especially 
emphasizes the importance of the chemical, electronic and machine tools industries, both 
as conduits of technological progress and suppliers of new and improved products and 
processes to the entire economy (ibid., p. 135). These three industries, he notes, totally 
dominate  "the  technology  sector”  of  the  economy.  This  raises  the  question  of  the 
relationship between the industries that make up what he terms "the technology sector" 
and other manufacturing activities. To put it bluntly: Are all parts of manufacturing 
equally conducive to growth?  
  As mentioned in the introduction, Cornwall also emphasizes the potential for catch-
up in productivity through imitation for countries behind the world technology frontier. 
However, he is at pain to stress that this catch-up is far from a free ride. Among the 
supporting  factors,  he  especially  emphasizes  the  supply  of  skills  (workers  and 
entrepreneurs), materials and capital equipment (ibid., p.111). In his modeling efforts 
and subsequent empirical work, however, he confines attention to investment as a share 
of value added which, together with the potential for imitation (proxied by GDP per 
                                                             
16 More recently, Cornwall has argued that above a certain threshold level of development, the 
importance of manufacturing for growth should be expected to decrease, since the rise in income per 
capita encourages a shift in demand from manufacturing products towards services (see Cornwall and   9 
capita), are assumed to determine the growth of manufacturing output. Note that this 
relationship, can be seen as a reduced form of the model discussed in the previous 
section (ibid., p. 139)  
  In  this  section  we  will  return  to  the  relationship  between  growth,  catch-up  and 
structural change discussed by Cornwall, taking into account the possible impact on 
growth  of  structural  changes  within  manufacturing,  as  well  as  that  of  other, 
"conditioning" factors, to use a more recent term. To do so, we need data that are less 
aggregated than those used earlier. UNIDO publishes data on manufacturing value added 
and employment for a large number of countries at different level of development, and it 
seems natural to try to use these data here. The data cover both three and four digit ISIC, 
but the coverage of the latter is too restricted in terms of countries and time span for our 
purposes. Since the relationship between productivity growth and structural change is of 
a long-term nature, a sufficiently long time span is necessary. After examining the data, 
the years 1973 and 1990 were chosen, since this allows more countries to be included 
than  any  other  combination  of  years  spanning  roughly  two  decades.  The  desire  to 
include other conditioning factors, such as investments in education, physical capital and 
R&D,  also  limits  the  number  of  countries  that  can  be  included  in  the  analysis. 
Furthermore, the analysis is confined to market economies (broadly defined). The final 
data set consists of forty countries from all parts of the world; Africa, America, Asia, 
Europe  and  Oceania.  With  the  exception  of  the  former,  the  data  set  appears  quite 
representative (due to data problems only three African countries could be included). 
  The dependent variable in our analysis is the growth rate of labor productivity (not 
production).  Labor  productivity  is  defined  as  value  added  divided  by  employment 
measured at current prices and converted to US dollars by the exchange rate (as supplied 
by UNIDO). The entries for 1990 are deflated to constant 1973 dollars by dividing by an 
index reflecting the growth in US producer prices over the period. Hence, productivity 
growth as defined here reflects changes in the quantities of the products that a country 
produces, changes in the relative prices of these products and changes in the exchange 
rate. The use of current exchange rates introduces a possible bias, to the extent that the 
exchange rates of any country in 1973 and/or 1990 were seriously over- or undervalued. 
However,  one  should  expect  any  such  effect,  although  important  from  a  short  run 
perspective, to be small over the longer run. 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Cornwall, 1994a,b). While this may be true, it does not explain the finding of no correlation at all 
between growth of GDP and growth of manufacturing for a cross-section of developed countries.   10 
  The hypothesis that we wish to test is that it matters for a country whether it puts its 
resources into expanding areas or chooses to concentrate its efforts on activities where 
prospects for growth are bleak. This hypothesis - obvious as it may seem - is not trivial 
since, as noted by Cornwall, it is often disputed by neoclassical economists. We define 
growth industries as the upper third of the distribution of the industries in our sample, 
ranked in terms of their productivity growth rates. The top ranking growth industry 
during  this  period  was  electrical  machinery  (including  electronics,  arguably  the 
technologically most progressive industry in recent decades). We therefore divide the 
growth industries into two groups, electrical machinery (ISIC 383) and high-growth 
(ISIC 351, 352, 341, 385, 382, 342, 313) and, for each country, calculate the change in 
the  share  of  the  manufacturing  labor  force  that  goes  to  these  two  groups.  The 
assumption, then, is that if structural change does not matter for growth, then the changes 
in these shares should not be correlated with growth, at least not significantly so. 
  However,  we  have  to  take  into  account  that  structural  change  within  the 
manufacturing sector is not the only factor that affects the growth of manufacturing 
productivity. If there are other omitted variables, and these tend to be correlated with our 
measures of structural change, we may get a biased estimate. To control for this, we 
include a number of variables that relate to the country as a whole and which may be 
thought of as characteristics of "the national system of innovation", or the pool of factors 
available at the national level for manufacturing (and other sectors of the economy). 
Among the variables included are those emphasized by Cornwall: initial productivity (in 
manufacturing) and the ratio of investment to GDP. In addition, we include some of the 
variables  fashioned  in  recent  econometric  work  on  growth  such  as  primary  and 
secondary  education  (share  of  age  group  enrolled)  and  export  orientation/openness 
(exports as a share of GDP). In contrast to most analyses in this area, we also control for 
the effort devoted to innovation (R&D as a share of GDP), since this may be a source of 
growth in its own right. All of these variables are measured mid-period (1980 or closest 
available year).
17 
  Table 2 contains estimation results for the growth of manufacturing productivity as a 
function  of  the  increase  in  the  employment  shares  of  high-growth  and  electrical 
machinery  industries  and  the  other  variables  mentioned  above.  As  in  the  previous 
                                                             
17 The industry data (productivity and employment shares) are from UNIDO, investment and exports as 
shares of GDP and education from World Development Report (World Bank, various editions), and   11 
section, we adopt a procedure that identifies and excludes outliers. This reduces the 
number of countries by between two and five depending on the specification.   
 
TABLE 2. STRUCTURAL CHANGE AND PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH 
 
   2.1   2.2   2.3   2.4   2.5   2.6   2.7   2.8 
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N    35   35   34   34   34   35   29   32 
 
 
Note: Estimated with OLS. Absolute t-statistics in brackets under coefficients. One, two and three stars 
denote significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively, in a two-tailed test. R
2 in brackets is 
adjusted for degrees of freedom. 
   
  Equations 1 and 4 report the results with only the two structural variables and a 
constant  term  (not  reported)  included,  with  and  without  continent  dummies, 
respectively.
18 The latter may be thought of as a rough test of the impact of other non-
identified factors that happen to be correlated geographically. Equations 2 and 5 repeat 
these  regression  with  education,  investment  and  initial  productivity,  all  in  log-form, 
included as conditioning factors, i.e., we test to what extent structural change matters 
                                                                                                                                                                              
R&D data are from OECD and UNESCO. In a few cases these data were supplemented with data from 
national sources.  
18 Oceania (Australia and New Zealand) is included in Asia in this study.   12 
when the effects of other growth-inducing factors have been accounted for. The results 
are very clear. High productivity growth and increases in the share of resources devoted 
to the electrical machinery industry go hand in hand. A one per cent increase in the 
employment share of the electrical machinery industry implies about one half percent 
higher  overall  growth  of  manufacturing  productivity.  Increasing  the  share  of 
employment  going  to  other  high-growth  industries  matters  much  less,  though.  The 
inclusion of other conditioning factors does not change these results to a significant 
extent, but the explanatory power of the model increases. Among the additional factors, 
education  (especially  secondary)  is  the  most  important.
19  Neither  the  share  of 
investments  in  GDP,  nor  the  initial  level  of  productivity  seems  to  matter  much  for 
growth. The same holds - surprisingly perhaps - for "openness" as reflected in exports as 
a share of GDP (equation 6).
20 
  The two last equations in the table (7 and 8) take into account investments in R&D 
(measured as a share of GDP), which recent theorizing in this area would suggest as 
being important (see, e.g., Romer 1990). This leads to a reduction in the number of 
countries included. Doubts may also be raised about the quality and comparability of the 
R&D data. Anyway, for this sample of countries, secondary education and R&D are so 
closely correlated, that only one of them can be retained. When R&D is chosen, the 
coefficient is positive as expected, but not significantly different from zero at the 10% 
level.
21 We also include an interaction variable, reflecting the hypothesis that the effects 
of R&D investment on growth are larger if undertaken in conjunction with an expansion 
of  the  electrical  machinery  industry.  This  hypothesis,  however,  receives  only  very 
moderate support. 
  The results from this section give ample support to Cornwall's argument regarding the 
importance  of  flexibility,  or  the  ability  to  transfer  resources  to  technologically 
                                                             
19 In most cases, the countries that were identified as outliers (and hence excluded) were poor countries 
with low educational standards. In the initial estimations (with these countries included) education 
(especially primary education) had somewhat more impact. 
20  We also estimated a version more akin to Cornwall’s reduced form, i.e., with only initial 
productivity (Y73 ) and investment (INV) as exogenous variables, and growth of labor productivity (G) 
as the endogenous variable.  This model turned out to have very little explanatory power. The result 
was (absolute t-values in brackets) 
 
G = 0.75Y73  + 3.19INV 




2) = 0.11(0.06) 
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progressive areas, for productivity growth. Hence, transformation clearly matters for 
growth. However, Cornwall’s emphasis on investment in physical capital in this context 
is not justified for the period under study here. Rather, the recipe for high growth of 
manufacturing productivity seems to be a combination of flexibility (targeting the right 
industries) and investments in skills. 
 
4. Quo Vadis Modern Capitalism? 
 
Cornwall built his analysis of Modern Capitalism on a combination of two strands of 
thought; the Schumpeter-Svennilson view of capitalist development as a process of 
qualitative  change  driven  by  innovation  and  diffusion  of  technology,  and  the 
Kaldorian idea of static and dynamic economies of scale in manufacturing as the 
driving force behind economic progress in the industrialized world. Combining these 
(and other) insights into a coherent perspective on modern economic growth was an 
important achievement in itself. He also provided convincing evidence from a group 
of industrialized countries in the fifties and sixties that supported his interpretation of 
the events. 
  What we have done in this paper is to update and extend his empirical analysis 
using a larger sample of countries and more recent data. We have found that the 
Schumpeter-Svennilson  perspective  of  growth  as  a  process  of  qualitative  (and 
structural) change, and the emphasis on the importance of skills and flexibility, has a 
lot to commend it. On the second set of ideas the evidence is more ambiguous. At 
least  for  many  of  the  technologically  and  economically  most  advanced  countries, 
manufacturing does not seem to be the ‘engine of growth’ assumed by Kaldor and 
Cornwall. Rather, it is for countries in the process of industrialization (NICs) that 
manufacturing  seems  to  matter  most.  This  may  have  to  do  with  the  role  of  the 
manufacturing  sector  in  acquiring  foreign  technology  and  generating  learning  and 
skills, in combination with forward and backward linkages, as argued by Cornwall in 
the case of the developed countries. However, it may also have to with another issue 
discussed  extensively  by  Cornwall  (ibid.,  chapter  IV):  the  existence  of  persistent 
differences in productivity levels (and growth) between sectors (“the dual economy”), 
                                                                                                                                                                              
21  In the initial estimation (before exclusion of outliers) the impact of R&D was  found to be both 
larger and significant (at the 1% level).   14 
and the role of the manufacturing growth in speeding up the transfer of labor from 
low to high productivity activities (from agriculture to manufacturing, for instance). 
  The differences in findings between the studies cited by Cornwall and the present 
study may also reflect a change in the way “Modern Capitalism” works. Arguably, the 
first  decades  after  the  second  world  war  constituted  a  period  during  which  the 
diffusion  of  scale-intensive  technology,  from  the  USA  to  Europe  and  Japan,  and 
learning from the use of these technologies, played a large role (Abramovitz 1994). 
However,  the  role  as  “engine  of  growth”  has  relocated  to  electronics  and  other 
industries characterized by a strong science base and heavy investments in R&D.  Our 
results indicate that there is a strong, positive and very robust correlation between a 
country’s  performance  in  these  new  growth  industries  and  the  rate  of  growth  of 
manufacturing productivity. This may indicate that there are strong positive spillovers 
from these kinds of activities, and that these spillovers, to some extent at least, are 
nationally embedded. However, there are reasons to believe that the technologies that 
emerge from the new growth industries (especially electronics), and the learning that 
follows, are equally (or even more) relevant in  many service industries. This is, of 
course, consistent with the finding of this paper that in most advanced countries, the 
distinction  between  manufacturing  and  services  has  lost  much  of  its  economic 
significance.   
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